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THE TRADE ACT OF 1974: COPING WITH UNEQUAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL COSTS 
SCOTT C. WHITNEY* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress has recently established an institutional framework to 
be employed in formulating and implementing international trade 
policy. On January 3, 1975, President Ford signed into law the 
Trade Act of 197 4, 1 which was enacted by Congress under its 
plenary constitutional authority to "lay and collect taxes, duties, 
imposts" and "to regulate commerce with foreign nations."2 Despite 
its constitutional power in these areas, since 1934 Congress has 
periodically delegated to the President specific and limited trade 
agreement power to negotiate reciprocal tariff and trade concessions 
with foreign nations. 3 Until the passage of the Trade Act of 1974, 
the most recent congressional delegation of authority to the Presi-
dent to negotiate trade agreements was the Trade Expansion Act of 
1962.4 The President's authority under this Act terminated June 30, 
196 7 and since that date the President has been without negotiating 
authority.5 The proposed Trade Act of 1970,6 which Congress failed 
to enact, was the last legislative attempt to address the trade policy 
of the United States prior to the Trade Act of 1974. 
In the interval since the last foreign trade legislation enacted by 
Congress in 1962, the economies of the world and of the United 
States have experienced radical changes. The extent and magnitude 
of these changes made it clear that United States trade policy was 
overdue for a reevaluation. In particular, the increasing importance 
of certain "nontariff barriers" or "distortions" called for special 
consideration. Foremost among these distortions were those which 
have arisen as a result of the increased costs of production caused by 
the pollution abatement and other environmental costs incurred by 
United States industry. These costs have also been incurred, to a 
lesser degree, by the industries of our foreign trade partners, espe-
cially the highly developed industrial nations. 
The purpose of this article is to focus on the domestic 
* Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law; A.B., 
Univ. of Nevada, 1949; J.D., Harvard, 1952. 
1 Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 Gan. 3, 1975). 
z U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8. 
l 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1970), as amended. 
4 19 u.s.c. §§ 1801-1991 (1970). 
5 Although the President's authority to negotiate and enter into new trade agreements 
expired in 1967, 19 U.S.C. § 1821(a) (1970), his authority to take retaliatory action against 
discriminatory trade practices of a foreign government remained unimpaired. See S. Rep. No. 
1431, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 237 (1970). 
6 H.R. No. 18970, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). 
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decision-making structures needed to cope with complex and emerg-
ing world economic conditions and distortions in international trade 
competition arising from unevenly incurred environmental control 
costs. Initially, the current economic trends necessitating revision of 
the United States' international trade decision-making structure will 
be reviewed. The impact of environmental control costs upon the 
United States' trade position will then be analyzed. Finally, the 
provisions of the Trade Act of 1974 will be discussed in order to 
provide the basis for an evaluation of the adequacy of the United 
States' international trade policy-making and decision-making struc-
ture to cope with economic distortions resulting from programs such 
as pollution abatement. 
Congress recognized the problem of unevenly incurred en-
vironmental abatement costs in 1972 and mandated an extensive 
and continuing study by the Department of Commerce to determine, 
among other things: (1) the short and long term effects of pollution 
abatement programs upon production costs and market prices of 
domestic manufacturers on an industry-by-industry basis; (2) a cor-
responding analysis with respect to foreign industrial nations; (3) the 
advantage gained by a foreign nation where it fails to require its 
manufacturers to implement comparable programs or in some way 
reimburses or subsidizes such programs; (4) ways to equalize any 
advantage that a foreign competitor may derive from the failure of 
its government to require pollution controls comparable to those of 
the United States. 7 
The first two reports of the Secretary of Commerce prepared 
under this mandate have now been published. 8 Although these 
reports contain some important advances in the difficult matter of 
ascertaining the extent of the impact of environmental costs upon 
foreign trade, they fall far short of reaching even tentative conclu-
sions. However, the reports do acknowledge that the cost of en-
vironmental requirements "will have significant economic conse-
quences" and substantially affect the United States trade position. 9 
II. THE SETTING: RECENT ECONOMIC TRENDS AFFECTING 
U.S. FOREIGN TRADE 
In 1974, as Congress undertook to consider what provisions to 
enact to produce an adequate trade reform bill, it faced a complex 
7 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendements of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 6, 
86 Stat. 897 (Oct. 18, 1972), codified in a note following 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. II, 1972). 
For the full text of § 6, see note 24 infra. 
8 U.S. Dep't of Commerce, The Effects of Pollution Abatement on International Trade, 
vol. I (1973) & vol. TI (1974) [hereinafter cited as Pollution Abatement and International 
Trade]. 
9 I Pollution Abatement and International Trade, supra note 8, at 16. 
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array of new economic forces unlike those that confronted the Con-
gress which debated and enacted the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. 
These new forces necessitated a major reconsideration of the con-
ventional techniques of formulating and applying a viable trade 
policy. 
A primary factor is that United States imports of merchandise 
have increased in the past decade-from $18.7 billion in 1964 to 
$69.1 billion in 1973-nearly a four-fold increase. 10 This trend will 
undoubtedly become accentuated because of an increased depen-
dence on foreign oil and because of the recent exorbitant price 
increases imposed by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). The Department of Interior forecast of supply 
and demand for oil in the United States for the remainder of the 
century supports this prediction: 
TABLE P 1 
TRILLIONS OF BTU 
1971 1975 1980 1985 2000 
Domestic Supply 22,569 22,130 23,770 23,600 21,220 
Percent of Total 74.0 63.1 56.3 46.6 29.7 
Supplemental Supplies 7,923 12,960 18,420 27,100 50,160 
Percent of Total 26.0 36.9 43.7 53.4 70.3 
Total 30,492 35,090 42,190 50,700 71,380 
Regardless of the precise accuracy of such forecasts, it is clear 
that even assuming developments such as the success of major 
conservation efforts, resort to alternative energy sources, increased 
exploration and production of petroleum (for example development 
of the outer continental shelf reserves), and increased refinery capac-
ity, a significant shortage in the supply of petroleum and petroleum 
products will remain. This continuing problem was reflected in 
presidential announcements of a national commitment to "Project 
lndependence,"12 a program intended to achieve national energy 
self-sufficiency at the earliest possible date. 13 However, one Project 
Independence study recognized that at best, "1985 is the earliest 
date by which self-sufficiency can reasonably be expected with this 
10 Staff of Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Staff Data and Materials on 
U.S. Trade and Balance of Payments 1 (Feb. 26, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Senate Comm. 
Staff Data]. 
11 U.S. Dep't of Interior, United States Energy Through the Year 2000, at 10 (1972). 
12 Former President Nixon outlined in detail his proposed Project Independence in a 
special message to Congress on the Energy Crisis. The text of this message appears in 120 
Cong. Rec. H 151 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1974). 
13 See, e.g., Atomic Energy Comm'n, The Nation's Energy Future vii (1973) (report 
submitted to President Richard M. Nb:on by D.L. Ray, Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy 
Comm'n). 
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program," and that at best, United States dependence on oil imports 
could only be reduced by half (to 6 million barrels per day) by 
1980. 14 This study also recognized that these objectives could be 
attained only if the complete recommended "Project Independence" 
program was adopted in time for Fiscal Year 197 5 budgeting and 
was sustained over the next decade and beyond, a remote likeli-
hood.15 Thus, the problem of dependence upon foreign sources of oil 
is likely to continue to have great impact upon the United States' 
balance of payments. Since 1966 the United States has incurred 
annual deficits in both trade and balance of payments, with the 
exception of 1973, when a modest surplus in the balance of pay-
ments was achieved because of unusually large sales of agricultural 
products. 16 
This decade also ·saw a severe, unprecedented overheating of 
the U.S. economy which greatly intensified upward pressures on 
domestic wages and prices. Increasing wages and prices of 
domestically-produced commodities injured their ability to compete 
with commodities produced abroad. The chart on the following 
page demonstrates the significantly higher increase in unit labor cost 
in manufacturing incurred by the United States as compared to that 
of its nine leading industrial trading partners. 17 
In terms of impairing the ability of domestically-produced 
commodities to compete with foreign commodities, perhaps the most 
ominous of all the recent economic trends is the decline in the 
growth rate of productivity in the United States during the past 
decade. Table II demonstrates this decline. 18 
The repercussions of these developments have been significant. Al-
though domestic wages have, in recent decades at least, been higher 
than those of other countries, until quite recently the impact of this 
factor upon the competitive position of domestic industry in interna-
tional trade has been offset by. the higher productivity of the Ameri-
can worker. This was demonstrated as recently as 1960-64, during 
which period the United States ·still exported more than it im-
ported.19 
14 Id. 
IS Id. At this time there is little evidence that the Project Independence study will 
become an "action" paper. 
16 See Senate Comm. Staff Data, supra note 10, at 1, 8. 
17 This chart is reprinted from volume 1 of compendium of Papers submitted to the 
Comm'n on Int'l Trade and Investment Policy, United States International Policy in an 
Interdependent World 539 (1971) [hereinafter cited as CITIP Study]. 
18 This table, which is based on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of 
Labor, appears in 1 CITIP Study, supra note 17, at 545. 
19 Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Tables and Statistical Material on 
U.S. Balance of Trade and Balance of Payments 1 (Dec. 1974). 
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NOTE: Data for trading partners are weighted according to U.S. imports from each 
country in 1965. Data for Europe pertain to Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland (wage earners only), and the United Kingdom. 
TABLE II 
AVERAGE PERCENT CHANGE IN OUTPUT PER MAN-HOUR FOR MANUFACTURING EMPLOYEES 
Country 1960-65 1965-69 1969-70 
United States 4.3 2.1 
Belgium 5.4 8.6 11.7* 
Canada 3.7 4.1 3 
France 4.8 7.0 9 
Germany 6.0 5.7 4 
Italy 7.1 3.7 1.2* 
Japan 8.2 15.1 13 
Netherlands 6.4 8.4 12 
Sweden 5.9 8.2 6 
United Kingdom 3.4 4.0 3 
S\•.itzerland 3.1 7.2 5 
* Not available for 1969-70; 1968-69 data used instead. 
To date American financial policymakers have been unable to 
arrest the problems created by the interaction of increased domestic 
prices, increased wage levels, and declining worker productivity. 
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The result has been an acceleration of the trend toward greater 
imports, a trend which is evident from the data in Table III. 20 
TABLE ill 
U.S. TRADE AND BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS DEFICITS 
[In billions of dollars] 
U.S. Trade Position Trade Balance 
Exports (X) Imports (M) C.I.F. (M) Balance of Payments 
Minus Excluding Official 
Foreign Foreign Settle- Basic 
Total Aid F.O.B. C.I.F. 1 F.O.B. Aid (X) Liquidity2 ments2 Balance 
1960 19.6 17.9 15.1 16.3 4.5 1.6 - 3.7 - 3.4 
1961 20.2 18.3 14.7 16.0 5.5 2.3 - 2.3 - 1.3 
1962 21.0 18.7 16.5 17.8 4.5 0.9 - 2.9 - 2.7 
-0.83 1963 22.5 19.9 17.2 18.6 5.3 1.3 - 2.7 - 1.9 
1964 25.8 23.1 18.7 20.3 7.1 2.8 - 2.7 - 1.5 
1965 26.7 24.3 21.5 23.2 5.2 1.1 - 2.5 - 1.3 
1966 29.5 27.0 25.6 27.7 3.9 - 0.7 - 2.2 .2 -1.7 
1967 31.0 28.5 26.9 28.8 4.1 - .3 - 4.7 - 3.4 -3.3 
1968 34.1 31.8 33.2 35.3 .9 - 3.5 - 1.6 - 1.6 -1.4 
1969 37.3 35.3 36.0 38.2 1.3 - 2.9 - 6.1 2.7 -3.0 
1970 42.7 40.7 40.0 42.4 2.7 - 1.7 - 4.7 -10.7 -3.0 
1971 43.5 41.7 45.6 48.3 -2.1 - 6.6 -22.7 -30.5 -9.6 
1972 49.2 47.5 55.6 58.9 -6.4 -11.4 -14.7 -11.1 -9.8 
19734 70.8 69.4 69.1 73.2 +1.7 - 3.8 - 7.9 - 5.3 +1.7 
1 C. I. F. imports for the years 1960-66 are assumed to be roughly equivalent to 108.3% of 
f.o.b. imports in accordance with a Bureau of Customs-Tariff Commission-Bureau of 
Census study based on 1966 arrivals. For the years 1967-73 estimates are based on Bureau of 
Customs-Bureau of Census studies showing estimated freight and insurance charges to be 6.9 
percent (1967), 6.3 percent (1968), 6.1 percent (1969), 6.2 percent (1970), 6.1 percent (1971), 
and 5.9 percent for 1972 and 1973. 
2 The liquidity and official settlements deficits for 1966-73 excludes SDR allocations. 
3 Annual average. 
4 Estimated on basis of partial data. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce. 
The effect of prolonged trade and balance of payments deficits 
upon the value of United States currency has been adverse. Recent 
inflationary developments contributed to staggering balance of trade 
and payments deficits between 1970 and 1972 and produced massive 
runs against the dollar. As a result, the United States became unable 
to maintain a fixed parity between the dollar and gold, and the fixed 
exchange rate structure collapsed on August 15, 1971.21 Sub-
sequently, there occurred several dollar devaluations, which further 
intensified the inflationary pressures on the U.S. economy. Devalua-
tion makes imports more expensive for domestic consumers and 
domestically-produced exports relatively less expensive for foreign 
20 Reprinted from Senate Comm. Staff Data, supra note 10, at 1. 
21 Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Summary and Analysis of H.R. 
10710 at 3 (Feb. 26, 1974). 
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consumers. Thus domestic prices for imports into the United States 
experience price increases. This in turn may trigger demands for 
higher wages so that a vicious wage-price cycle may be set in 
motion. Correspondingly, the increase in exports which resulted 
from the dollar devaluations have tended to create domestic re-
source or commodity shortages. These shortages in turn have 
created further pressure for domestic price increases and, in some 
instances, necessitate the imposition of export controls which con-
travene one of the primary purposes of devaluation, i.e., the rever-
sal of unfavorable trade and payments balances. The adverse Im-
pact of this situation upon the value of U.S. currency is clear. The 
charts on the following page demonstrate the international position 
of United States currency. 22 
This factual presentation demonstrates that developments in 
international and domestic economic conditions have substantially 
contributed to the worsening competitive position of domestic busi-
ness. This result requires a focus on one of its specific causes-
environmental control cost distortions, which are nontariff barriers 
to foreign marketing of domestic commodities. 
III. DISTORTIONS ARISING FROM ENVIRONMENTAL 
CoNTROL CosTS 
The need to cope with the problems of inflation, declining 
worker productivity, continuing national budget deficits, prolonged 
disequilibria in balance of trade and payments, and the unfavorable 
rate of exchange between United States currency and that of its 
major trading partners is apparent. All of these necessary policy 
objectives are inextricably related to inflation, the abatement of 
which has recently been designated as the top national priority by 
President Ford in his Economic Address to a joint session of the 
Congress. 23 Clearly, trade reform legislation is an important element 
in the total program to control inflation and stabilize the national 
economy. 
Until comparatively recently, however, the extent to which 
these adverse economic forces are aggravated by both short and long 
term environmental costs was not widely recognized. These costs 
may be defined as the additional costs incurred by producers of any 
commodity or service, as a result of environmental regulation. Ex-
pressed in terms of classical economics, federal, state and local 
environmental reform and planning legislation and implementing 
regulations, especially those imposed since 1969, have set in motion 
22 The charts are reprinted from Senate Comm. Staff Data, supra note 10, at 46. 
23 120 Cong. Rec. H. 10, 120 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1974). 
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an economic process whereby environmental externalities are being 
converted into costs of production, and therefore, introduced into 
the nation's price structure. Thus, there results not only domestic 
price increases, but also, as Congress has recognized, a substantial 
impact upon the foreign trade posture of the United States. 
A. Measuring Environmental Control Costs 
As a result of its recognition of the influence of domestic en-
vironmental costs upon U.S. foreign trade, Congress directed the 
Secretary of Commerce, in section 6 of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments of 1972,24 to study the matter. The cen-
tral task imposed by section 6 is the identification and quantification 
of costs incurred by domestic and foreign manufacturers in the 
course of compliance with environmental laws and regulations. To 
24 The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 6, codified in a note 
following 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. II, 1972), provides: 
(a) The Secretary of Commerce, in cooperation with other interested Federal Agen-
cies and with representatives of industry and the public, shall undertake im-
mediately an investigation and study to determine-
(!) the e.xtent to which pollution abatement and control programs will be 
imposed on, or voluntarily undertaken by, United States manufacturers in the 
near future and the probable short- and long-range effects of the costs of such 
programs (computed to the greatest e.xtent practicable on an industry-by-
industry basis) on (A) the production costs of such domestic manufacturers, and 
(B) the market prices of the goods produced by them; 
(2) the probable e:1:tent to which pollution abatement and control programs will 
be implemented in foreign industrial nations in the near future and the extent to 
which the production costs (computed to the greatest extent practicable on an 
industry-by-industry basis) of foreign manufacturers will be affected by the costs 
of such programs; 
(3) the probable competitive advantage which any article manufactured in a 
foreign nation will likely have in relation to a comparable article made in the 
United States if that foreign nation-
(A) does not require its manufacturers to implement pollution abatement 
and control programs, 
(B) requires a lesser degree of pollution abatement and control in its 
programs, or 
(C) in any way reimburses or otherwise subsidizes its manufacturers for the 
costs of such programs; 
(4) alternative means by which any competitive advantage accruing to the 
products of any foreign nation as a result of any factor described in paragraph 
(3) may be (A) accurately and quickly determined, and (B) equalized, for 
e."ample, by the imposition of a surcharge or duty, on a foreign product in an 
amount necessary to compensate for such advantage; and 
(5) the impact, if any, which the imposition of a compensating tariff or other 
equalizing measure may have in encouraging foreign nations to implement 
pollution abatement and control programs. 
(b) The Secretary shall make an initial report to the President and Congress within 
si" months after the date of enactment of this section of the results of the study and 
investigation carried out pursuant to this section and shall make additional reports 
thereafter at such times as he deems appropriate taking into account the develop-
ment of relevant data, but not less than once every twelve months. 
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date the studies conducted pursuant to section 6 have fallen short of 
this goal. The most recent study acknowledges that "there are 
virtually no reliable, comprehensive cost analyses in being which 
can be directly used to answer the questions posed by Section 6. "25 
Moreover, the study concedes, "no studies or approaches have yet 
been identified that are directly useful in reaching confident conclu· 
sions about pollution costs impacts on international trade."26 The 
lack of useful studies is due largely to two factors. 
1. The accurate and consistent identification of fixed 
and operating pollution control costs is the core of the 
methodological difficulty, both from the viewpoint of 
structuring the cost components themselves, and with re· 
spect to the problems associated with collection of actual 
plant data. For virtually all manufacturing industries, 
wide variations exist in cost impacts related to pollution 
controls as . a result of plant-to-plant variations of such 
factors as age of equipment; geographical location; and the 
production processes, fuels, and materials employed. In 
addition, determination of the full impact of pollution con· 
trol costs for any product line involves an aggregation of 
costs incurred by all suppliers of the end-product manufac· 
turers. Similar plant-to-plant variations occur within these 
supplier industries, thereby compounding the difficulty of 
direct analysis and conclusions. 
2. The pollution cost studies carried out by other or· 
ganizations are invariably designed to serve purposes that 
are substantially different from those set out in Section 6. 
This is particularly true of cost studies carried out by 
regulatory agencies which often seek to identify general 
levels of aggregate costs which are not detailed enough to 
allow conclusions about impacts on price and trade for 
particular product lines. 27 
The difficulties of data compilation with respect to foreign com-
petitors are even greater because, in addition to the foregoing prob-
lems, American researchers must deal with varying degrees of un-
cooperativeness and secretive attitudes as to what is conceived to be 
proprietary and confidential business information. 
One of the earliest efforts to quantify domestic environmental 
costs on anything approaching a national basis consisted of a sum-
2S IT Pollution Abatement and International Trade, supra note 8, at 3. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
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mary of eleven microeconomic studies prepared by private economic 
consultant firms for the Council on Environmental Quality, the 
Department of Commerce and the Environmental Protection 
Agency, which was published as a joint-agency study in March of 
1972.28 The eleven studies, each of which focused upon a specific 
industry, undertook to assess the cost of the air and water pollution 
abatement requirements then in effect. In addition, this work con-
tained a macroeconomic study of the impact of air and water pollu-
tion control upon the ecoJ:lomy in general, and upon international 
trade and balance of payments in particular. One obvious weakness 
of this study is its scope: it undertook to quantify only costs arising 
from air and water pollution control and did not attempt to assess 
costs arising from other types of environmental regulation. 
Moreover, events subsequent to publication of the study have made 
it clear that the 1972 forecasts of air and water pollution costs were 
substantially understated: the enactment of the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act Amendments of 197229 and the extensive promul-
gation of air and water quality regulations subsequent to March 
1972 have produced and will continue to produce environmental 
control costs many times greater than those originally forecast. 
Since the publication of the joint-agency report various other 
studies have been undertaken, and considerable effort is now being 
made to structure methodologies that will produce the data required 
to organize a study that adequately addresses the questions raised by 
Congress. One such study is that of the Social and Environmental 
Statistics Administration (SESA) of the Department of Commerce. 
The objective of the SESA program is to devise a conceptual 
framework for a full-scale pollution abatement expenditures survey. 
The initial phase will undertake to quantify capital expenditures 
and operating costs for abatement of air and water pollution and 
solid waste disposal. 30 The basic technique will be a skillfully struc-
tured pilot survey which will be sent to approximately 1100 estab-
lishments falling within 12 or 14 standard industrial classifications. 
The data garnered from the pilot program will be factored into a 
more comprehensive survey covering a minimum of 15,000 estab-
lishments representing 20 standard industrial classifications. This 
broad survey effort will be supplemented by two more specialized 
and detailed surveys: one covering 17,000 mineral producing and 
manufacturing establishments that consume more than 20 million 
28 Council on Environmental Quality, Dep't of Commerce, and Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, The Economic Impact of Pollution Control: A Summary of Recent Studies 
(1972}. 
29 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. ill, 1973}. 
3° II Pollution Abatement and International Trade, supra note 8, at 7-8. 
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gallons of oil annually; the other an attempt to derive data on a 
company rather than industry basis. 31 
Pursuant to section 6(a)(1) of the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act Amendments of 1972,32 the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) has contracted for a series of studies to develop cost 
data to determine the availability and achievability of pollution 
control systems for 27 industrial categories by July 1, 1977 and July 
1983, respectively. The EPA project involves both technical and 
economic analysis. The technical analysis will determine what con-
trol systems will be necessary to comply with effluent guidelines and 
the economic analysis will quantify the capital investment and 
operating costs of such technology. While this study addresses itself 
to only part of the environmental cost problem, the methodological 
and data developments. that result from the study may be useful in 
other more comprehensive surveys. 33 
The foregoing studies and reports represent important first 
steps in developing an adequate data base and methodology with 
which to fashion a meaningful response to the investigation called 
for by Congress. However, it must be recognized that even if these 
domestic data gathering methods and analyses are complete and 
accurate, the more difficult portions of the study remain: (1) the 
collection of comparable data from all relevant trade partners;34 (2) 
determination of the actual effects upon U.S. imports and exports to 
be expected from various cost impact differentials on a product-by-
product as well as on an overall basis. This determination consti-
tutes the penultimate purpose of the study mandated by Congress. 
However, it will not be possible to fulfill that purpose until the data 
from trade partners becomes available. 
It was recognized in 1971 that environmental costs would have 
a substantial impact upon our international trade and investment 
relations. The studies submitted to the Commission on International 
Trade and Investment Policy (CITIP) contain an analysis entitled 
"International Economic Implications of Environmental Control 
and Pollution Abatement Programs."35 This study was completed in 
July of 1971, and concluded that if the United States imposed strict 
anti-pollution measures upon domestic industry, either by direct 
3t Id. 
32 Codified in a note following 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. II, 1972). For text of§ 6(a)(1), 
see note 24 supra. 
33 II Pollution Abatement and International Trade, supra note 8, at 8-10. 
34 The Commerce Department has begun to analyze data with respect to the pollution 
control programs of nine other industrialized nations: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. See I Pollution Abatement and 
International Trade, supra note 8, at 20 and Appendices A-1 to A-84. 
35 1 CITIP Study, supra note 17, at 777-90. 
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regulation or by a ta~ing scheme; United States export and import-
competing industries would be placed at a competitive disadvantage 
in both world and domestic markets. 36 Furthermore, it pointed out 
that the United States trade balance and level of national income 
would thereby be adversely affected: unless countervailing or com-
pensatory measures were adopted, a policy of strict environmental 
regulation would encourage the outflow of investment funds to 
foreign production sites. This outflow would be likely to worsen the 
balance of payments deficits and to affect domestic growth rates 
and employment adversely. 37 Another obvious result would be a 
significant decline in the United States' share of many world 
markets.38 The United States would thus aggravate an already 
pronounced trend of pricing domestic industry out of important 
world markets and of making domestic markets more vulnerable to 
competition by imports. 
The 1971 CITIP study recommended that the Committee on 
Environment, an organ of the United Nations Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, be delegated the task of 
devising an international agreement under which the industrial na-
tions would adopt "pollution control measures which incorporate 
costs in price,"39 by which it is apparently meant that nations would 
agree to quantify environmental costs and seek to incorporate that 
increment representing environmental cost into final commodity 
pricing. To date this international agreement has not been reached. 
Even if such an agreement is reached and implemented, the CITIP 
study acknowledged that specific United States export- and import-
competing industries might still be s~riously affected, in which event 
it concludes that adjustment assistance similar to that provided by 
the 1962 Trade Expansion Act would be the best available rem-
edy.4o 
Thus, until an effective and reliable international reporting 
system can be established and, equally important, until an interna-
tional regulatory structure can be created to formulate equalization 
measures appropriate to correct an improper competitive advantage 
arising from inequalities of environmental protection costs, it will 
probably not be possible to achieve fully the objective of Congress to 
be able to "accurately and quickly determine"41 if an improper 
36 Id. at 787. 
37 Id. at 784. 
3s Id. 
39 Id. at 787. 
40 Id. at 788. For a discussion of the adjustment assistance remedy for trade distortions, 
~ee text at notes 59-82 infra. 
41 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 6(a)(4)(A), codified in 
note following 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. IT, 1972). 
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competitive advantage, as defined in section 6(a)(3) of the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,42 is occurring, 
and if so, to equalize the situation by appropriate countermeasures. 
Since potent economic forces make immediate responses to the 
problem essential, this delay in securing the data necessary to for-
mulate equalization measures is intolerable. It should be evident 
from the analysis of the recent economic trends that it is not feasible 
to postpone the United States' response to distortions arising from 
unequal incurrence of environmental protection costs for the decade 
or more that would probably be required to perfect such interna-
tional arrangements. 
B. Costs of Environmental Regulation 
Despite the lack of comprehensive data sufficient to quantify 
the full extent of the impact of pollution abatement and other 
environmental protection costs on the United States balance of trade 
and payments, significant evidence suggests that the impact of these 
distortions is substantial and possibly critical to the national 
economic welfare. These environmental control cost distortions take 
a variety of forms. It has already been noted that United States 
energy demands upon foreign sources have had and will continue to 
have major impact on the United States balance of trade and 
payments and that environmental constraints on domestic oil and 
gas production and refinement substantially increase United States 
dependence on foreign sources at a time when costs are increasing 
exponentially.43 The precise extent to which United States environ-
mental regulations contribute to the outflow of capital may be 
unknown, but it is widely recognized that the outflow of capital 
exerts an adverse influence both upon the balance of trade and 
payments and upon the level of employment in the United States. 
A further adverse economic impact results from the fact that 
existing environmental laws and regulations force domestic produc-
ers to allocate scarce capital to pollution abatement technology 
rather than to productive capacity. A recent study shows that be-
cause of the cost of compliance with environmental laws, the pulp 
and paper, iron and steel, and non-ferrous metals industries will 
suffer significant additional import penetration, with the concomi-
tant adverse effects upon the United States trade position.44 For 
example, the investment required of the iron and steel industry to 
finance necessary environmental controls would be sufficient to in-
42 See note following 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. ll, 1972). For text of § 6, see note 24 
supra. 
43 See text at notes 10-16 supra. 
44 ll Pollution Abatement and International Trade, supra note 8, at 14. 
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crease its productive capacity to a level of 10-11 million product tons 
by 1978.45 Since this investment, under current environmental laws 
and regulations, must be allocated to abatement technology, there 
will be no such increase in capacity. Thus, increased domestic 
demand for steel will have to be met by imports, causing an import 
penetration that might not result without the cost of compliance 
with environmental regulations. 46 The foregoing problems stem-
ming from domestic environmental regulation are not themselves 
susceptible to easy solutions by changes in United States trade 
policy.47 Yet the existence of these stresses on the national economy 
increases the need for effective strategies to counteract competitive 
irregularities arising from environmental cost advantages enjoyed by 
various United States trade partners. 
A recent industry "disaggregation study" provides a reasonably 
complete indication of the net impact upon United States export-
and import-competing industries of meeting environmental abate-
ment costs, relative to the effective protection now offered United 
States import-competing industries under present tariff levels. 48 
This scholarly study estimated environmental costs for each of a 
number of specific commodities, including capital and depreciation 
costs for abatement technology, operating costs, and research and 
development expenditures. These pollution control cost estimates 
were then articulated into the total process ·of manufacturing the 
final product expressed as a ratio of cost to dollar volume of sales. 49 
In order to form a basis for determining competitive impact, it is 
necessary to equate these costs to the "effective tariff protection" 
now afforded these commodities. 50 Using the weighted average of 
total environmental costs protection as a percent of value added for 
the selected industries, the study shows that the environmental costs 
comprise four percent of total value, which in turn represents 
twenty-seven percent of the total effective rate of protection af-
forded these commodities under existing tariffs and quantifiable 
non-tariff barriers. 51 The study demonstrates that more than one-
45 ld. 
46 ld. 
47 U.S. domestic policy may be changed more easily. The current national attention 
given to controlling inflation and improving the posture of the United States in international 
trade may result in legislative and executive review of existing environmental laws to deter-
mine whether the economic and inflationary impacts outweigh their benefits or whether more 
cost-effective strategies can be substituted. 
48 Walter, The Pollution Content of American Trade, 11 West. Econ. J. 61 (1973). 
49 Id. 
50 
"Effective tariff protection" includes not merely stated or nominal tariff levels but also 
quantifiable non-tariff barriers such as quotas. 
51 Walter, supra note 46, at 61. See also II Pollution Abatement and International 
Trade, supra note 8, at 58. 
591 
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERICAL LAW REVIEW 
fourth of the effective protection Congress intended to accord the 
selected industries has in fact been eroded by environmental costs. 52 
Thus it is evident that meaningful congressional consideration 
of trade reform legislation must take into account a series of unpre-
cedented economic forces affecting this nation's world trade posi-
tion: (1) spiralling inflationary costs on a scale never before experi-
enced in this country during this century; (2) significantly declining 
worker productivity; (3) continued deterioration in balance of trade 
and payments; (4) substantial and continuing budget deficits; (5) 
major impacts on the relative exchange value of our currency; (6) a 
massive and increasing import requirement of increasingly expen-
sive foreign oil; (7) as yet uncalculated, but concededly substantial 
environmental costs which promise to price products manufactured 
domestically further out of the market. Both houses of Congress 
considered different strategies and institutional solutions to cope 
with these conditions. 53 Congressional consideration resulted in the 
enactment of the Trade Act of 197 4. 
IV. TRADE ACT OF 1974: THE CURRENT DECISION-MAKING 
STRUCTURE FOR COUNTERACTING DISTORTIONS 
The adverse impacts upon United States trade arising from 
distortions resulting from the unequal incurrence of environmental 
control costs between one or more United States trade partners and 
United States producers result from two specific causes. The first 
and most obvious cause is the significant increase of imports into the 
United States due to the advantages gained by a foreign competitor 
who incurs lower environmental control costs. In such instances 
import relief for domestic producers is the appropriate remedy. Title 
II of the Trade Act of 197454 establishes the decision-making 
mechanism for provision of this relief. The other specific cause of 
adverse effects upon United States trade from environmental cost 
distortions is the use of various "unfair" trade practices by a foreign 
trade partner. Two examples of these trade practices are foreign 
governmental subsidies to offset environmental control costs and 
governmental exemptions from environmental control requirements. 
In such instances the remedy afforded domestic producers is relief 
from these trade practices. Title ill of the Trade Act of 197455 
provides these remedies. 
For purposes of analysis of the provisions of the Trade Act of 
1974, it is assumed that no international regulatory apparatus 
52 \Valter, supra note 46, at 61. 
53 See generally S. Rep. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). 
54 Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 2011-41. 
55 Id., 88 Stat. 2041-56. 
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adequate to cope with inequalities in environmental control costs 
will be forthcoming in the foreseeable future and that the United 
States will therefore be obliged to develop unilateral strategies to 
cope with this problem. Moreover, this analysis will not discuss the 
question of which unilateral measures constitute the most appro-
priate remedies for such distortions. 56 Instead, this analysis will 
focus on the issue of what trade decision-making structure would 
best enable the United States to respond effectively to such distor-
tions in order to protect vulnerable sectors of domestic industry and 
to improve the overall balance of trade and payments position of the 
United States. 
A. Import Relief Provisions 
Where a domestic producer is either threatened with serious 
injury or is actually injured by increased imports arising from the 
price advantages gained by foreign producers as a result of lower 
environmental control costs, one possible remedy is the granting of 
import relief. Import relief may take the form of offsetting duty 
increases, tariff-rate quotas, quantitative restrictions, or use of or-
derly marketing agreements. This analysis will not consider which 
specific type of import relief may be the most appropriate remedy in 
a particular situation. Instead, in discussing the Trade Act of 1974, 
it will focus on what institutional decision-making structure is best 
suited to determine when import relief is warranted. 
The Trade Act of 1974 makes major changes in the import 
relief apparatus established by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 
(1962 Act). Under the 1962 Act, as construed by the United States 
Tariff Commission, 57 there were four prerequisites to an affirmative 
finding with respect to an industry, on the basis of which finding the 
President could proclaim "such increase in, or imposition of, any 
duty or other import restriction on the article causing or threatening 
to cause serious injury to such industry as he determines to be 
necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury to such industry."58 
These prerequisites were: (1) imports of an article similar to or 
competitive with one produced by the domestic industry must be 
increasing; (2) the increased imports must be in major part the result 
of trade agreement concessions; (3) the domestic industry producing 
56 For an analysis of the various options available to counteract environmental cost 
distortions, see Kirgis, Effective Pollution Control in Industrialized Countries; International 
Economic Disincentives, Policy Responses, and the GATT, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 860 (1972). See 
also Dep't of Treasury, GATT Studies in International Trade, No. 1, Industrial Pollution 
Control and International Trade (1971). 
57 U.S. Tariff Comm'n, Nonrubber Footwear 6 (No. 359, Jan. 1971), noted in Recent 
Decisions, 7 Texas Int'l L.J. 163 (1.971). 
58 19 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(1) (1970). 
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the like or competitive article must be suffering serious injury; and 
(4) the increased imports must be the major factor in causing or 
threatening to cause serious injury. 59 
In addition to import relief for an industry, the 1962 Act 
authorized both firms and groups of workers to petition for adjust-
ment assistance. 60 To qualify for such individual relief, petitioners 
had to meet the same four prerequisites. 61 At the outset, little relief 
was obtained under these provisions. During the first seven years 
under the 1962 Act, no relief was granted either to a firm or to a 
group of workers. In 1969, the Tariff Commission granted relief to 
two workers' groups in the form of adjustment assistance. 62 There-
after, as of April 1972, relief was granted in response to 39 petitions 
from groups of workers and 11 petitions from firms. 63 Relief to an 
industry has been rare. 64 
The 1974 Act will most likely facilitate the provision of import 
relief to firms and groups of workers. Unlike the 1962 Act, under 
the Trade Act of 1974 no causal link to trade concessions is required 
for relief. 65 Secondly, the criteria as to the extent to which imports 
must have contributed to the injury to an industry, firms or workers 
have been relaxed by the 1974 Act. Under the 1974 Act there are 
two different criteria: (1) for industry, a Trade Commission66 finding 
is required that increased imports are or threaten to become a 
substantial cause of serious injury, 67 a term defined by the Act to 
mean a cause that is "not less than any other cause;"68 and (2) for 
workers, the Secretary of Labor must find that a significant number 
or proportion of workers have become totally or partially separated, 
that sales or production have decreased absolutely and that in-
creased imports contributed importantly to the decline in sales or 
production and to the separation of workers. 69 For individual firms, 
the Secretary of Commerce must make the same findings as those 
59 U.S. Tariff Comm'n, Nonrubber Footwear 6 (No. 359, Jan. 1971). Sec note 57 supra. 
60 19 U.S.C. §§ 1901(c)(l), (2), (3) (1970). 
61 See id. 
62 U.S. Tariff Comm'n, Buttweld Pipe (No. 297, Nov. 1969); U.S. Tariff Comm'n, 
Transmission Towers & Parts (No. 298, Nov. 1969). 
63 See Fulda, Adjustment to Hardship Caused by Imports: The New Decisions of the 
Tariff Commission and the Need for Legislative Clarification, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 791, 800 
(1972). 
64 For a detailed analysis of the Tariff Commission's interpretation of the Trade Expan-
sion Act of 1962, see id. 
6s Trade Act of 1974, § 201, 88 Stat. 2011. 
66 Trade Act of 1974, § 171, 88 Stat. 2009, amending 19 U.S.C. § 1330 (1970). This 
section changed the name of the United States Tariff Commission to the United States 
International Trade Commission. 
67 Trade Act of 1974, § 201(b)(1), 88 Stat. 2012. 
68 Trade Act of 1974, § 201(b)(4), 88 Stat. 2012. 
69 Trade Act of 1974, § 222, 88 Stat. 2019. 
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required for relief of worker injury. 70 The term "contributed impor-
tantly" is defined as "a cause which is important but not necessarily 
more important than any other cause."71 
Under the 1962 Act, the predecessor of the Trade Commission 
would institute an investigation upon the filing of an import relief 
petition by industry or labor groups, by the Senate Committee on 
Finance, by the House Ways and Means Committee, by the Presi-
dent or upon the initiative of the Commission itself. 72 This com-
plaint procedure is continued under the new law, and in addition 
the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations73 is also au-
thorized to petition for import relief. 74 
Determination of whether increased imports are in fact a sub-
stantial cause of serious injury is based upon the satisfaction of three 
specific economic conditions: (1) significant idling of productive 
facilities; (2) inability of a significant number of firms to operate at a 
reasonable level of profit; and (3) significant unemployment or 
underemployment within the industry.75 With respect to the threat 
of serious injury the Commission is required to consider whether 
there has been: (1) a decline in sales; (2) a higher and growing 
inventory; and (3) a downward trend in production, profits, wages, 
or employment in the domestic industry concerned. 76 With respect 
to substantial cause, the Trade Commission must take into account 
whether there has been: (1) an increase in imports (either absolute or 
relative to domestic production); and (2) a decline in the proportion 
of the domestic market supplied by domestic producers. 77 New 
provisions in the "escape clause" section of the 1974 Act require the 
Trade Commission to investigate and report on efforts by firms and 
workers in the industry to compete more effectively with imports78 
and to determine whether or not increased imports may be attribut-
able to problems solved by resort to the remedial provisions of the 
Antidumping Act of 1921,79 the countervailing duty law, or under 
70 Trade Act of 1974, § 251(c), 88 Stat. 2030. 
71 Trade Act of 1974, §§ 222, 251(c), 88 Stat. 2019, 2030. 
72 19 u.s.c. § 1901(b)(1) (1970). 
73 The Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations is established by 
§ 141(a) of the Trade Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1999. The Special Representative is appointed by 
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Id. The Special Representative is the 
successor to the identically-named office created pursuant to Executive Order No. 11075, 28 
Fed. Reg. 473 (Jan. 15, 1963). 
74 Trade Act of 1974, § 201(b)(1), 88 Stat. 2012. 
7S Trade Act of 1974, § 201(b)(2)(A), 88 Stat. 2012. 
76 Trade Act of 1974, § 201(b)(2)(B), 88 Stat. 2012. 
77 Trade Act of 1974, § 201(b)(2)(C), 88 Stat. 2012. 
78 Trade Act of 1974, § 201(b)(5), 88 Stat. 2012. 
79 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-71 (1970). The Antidumping Act of 1921 empowers the Secretary of 
the Treasury to take certain ameliorative steps whenever there is a finding that a domestic 
industry is being, or is likely to be injured, by the sale of foreign merchandise at less than its 
fair value either in the United States or elsewhere. Id. §§ 160-61. 
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those other remedial provisions of the 1974 Act dealing with unfair 
trade practices. 80 In the last case the agencies which administer the 
relevant provisions of law are to be notified. If the Trade Commis-
sion does find that a serious injury or threat of serious injury exists, 
it must include in its report the amount of duty increase or imposi-
tion of other import restrictions necessary to prevent or remedy such 
injury. 81 Alternatively, if it finds that adjustment assistance for a 
workers' group, a firm or a community can remedy the injury, it 
must recommend the provision of such assistance. 82 
The critical question arising in appeals for relief under the 
Trade Act of 1974 is what presidential action is taken after the 
Trade Commission' has concluded its investigation and made an 
affirmative finding. Under the 1974 Act, upon receiving an affirma-
tive finding of injury fmm the Trade Commission, the President: (1) 
must consider the extent to which adjustment assistance has been or 
could be made available;83 and {2) may decide to provide import 
relief. 84 The President is then required to make his decision within 
60 days after receiving the Trade Commission report. 85 In deciding 
whether or not to provide import relief, the President is required to 
take into consideration several factors: (I) the probable effectiveness 
of import relief as a means to promote adjustment; {2) the effect of 
import relief upon consumers; {3) the impact upon domestic indus-
tries and firms of any possible modification of import restrictions 
which may result from international obligations to provide compen-
sation;86 and (4) the economic and social costs which would be 
incurred by taxpayers, communities, and workers, if import relief 
were or were not provided. 87 
The 1974 Act authorizes the President to impose one or more of 
the following import relief measures: duty increases; tariff-rate 
quotas; quantitative restrictions; orderly marketing agreements; or 
any combination of such actions. 88 Whenever the President selects a 
particular measure or measures to provide import relief, he is re-
80 Trade Act of 1974, § 201(b)(6), 88 Stat. 2013. 
81 Trade Act of 1974, § 201(d)(1)(A), 88 Stat. 2013. 
82 Trade Act of 1974, § 201(d)(1)(B), 88 Stat. 2013. 
83 Trade Act of 1974, § 202(a)(1)(B), 88 Stat. 2014. 
84 Trade Act of 1974, § 202(a)(1)(A), 88 Stat. 2014. 
85 Trade Act of 1974, § 202(b), 88 Stat. 2014. 
86 The industries and firms referred to here should not be confused with industries and 
firms that might petition for import relief under Title II of the Act, 88 Stat. 2011; rather, they 
are industries and firms that might be affected by presidential action under § 123 of the Act, 
88 Stat. 1989, which provides that whenever any action is taken under§ 203, 88 Stat. 2015, 
the President may enter into trade agreements with foreign governments for the purpose of 
granting new concessions as compensation for such actions in order to maintain the general 
level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions. 
87 Trade Act of 1974, § 202(c), 88 Stat. 2014. 
88 Trade Act of 1974, § 203(a), 88 Stat. 2015. 
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quired to report his action to Congress. 89 If the action taken by the 
President differs from the recommendation of the Trade Commis-
sion, he must state the reason for the difference. 90 If he determines 
that the provision of import relief is not in the national economic 
interest, he must state the reasons why, as well as indicate what 
steps he is taking, other than adjustment assistance programs, to 
repair the serious injury found by the Commission. 91 
If the President determines that import relief is appropriate, he 
must proclaim the award of such relief and require that it take effect 
within 15 days of his determination. 92 However, if on the date of his 
determination he announces his intention to negotiate an orderly 
marketing agreement under sections 203(a)(4) or (5) of the 1974 
Act, 93 then such relief must be proclaimed and take effect within 90 
days of the determination date. 94 In addition, if the initial form of 
relief proclaimed does not include an orderly marketing agreement, 
such an agreement may thereafter be negotiated with a foreign 
government; and after such an agreement takes effect, the President 
may suspend or terminate, in whole or in part, the initial form of 
relief granted. 95 
If the President reports to Congress that he has determined not 
to provide import relief despite an affirmative determination by the 
Trade Commission under section 201(b), 96 or that he is granting 
relief that is different from that recommended by the Commission, 
Congress may override the President's determination and give effect 
to the Commission's recommendation by a simple majority vote 
taken within ninety days of the President's report to Congress. 97 
89 Trade Act of 1974, § 203(b), 88 Stat. 2015. 
9° Trade Act of 1974, § 203(b)(1), 88 Stat. 2015. 
91 Trade Act of 1974, § 203(b)(2), 88 Stat. 2015. 
92 Trade Act of 1974, § 203(e)(1), 88 Stat. 2016. 
93 88 Stat. 2015. 
94 Trade Act of 1974, § 203(e)(1), 88 Stat. 2016. For purposes of the proclamation of 
relief, the "import relief determination date" is the date of the President's determination under 
s 202(b), 88 Stat. 2014. 
95 Trade Act of 1974, § 203(e)(2), 88 Stat. 2016. If, at any time an orderly marketing 
agreement does not continue to be effective, the President may grant other forms of import 
relief so long as the time limitations of § 203(h), 88 Stat. 2017, are not exceeded. Id. § 
203(e)(3), 88 Stat. 2016. 
96 88 Stat. 2012. 
97 Trade Act of 1974, § 203(c), 88 Stat. 2016. This is the procedure which was proposed 
by the Senate Finance Committee, with a slight modification. Under the original Senate 
version of the Act the President had no discretion to withhold relief in the face of an 
affirmative determination by the Commission under§ 201(b): he would have been required to 
take some form of positive action. If he opted for a form of relief that differed from that 
recommended by the Commission, Congress could compel adoption of the Commission's 
recommendation by simple majority vote. See S. Rep. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 84 
(1974). The original House version would not have required the President to take positive 
action whenever there was a finding of serious injury by the Commission, and Congress 
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The provision for congressional override of a presidential determina-
tion regarding import relief is a significant departure from the prior 
congressional practice of delegating to the President nearly absolute 
discretion over such matters. Along with other provisions of the 
Trade Act of 1974,98 it reflects a gain of power by the Trade 
Commission at the expense of the President, by virtue of the con-
gressional retention of supervisory powers which, when affirma-
tively exercised, give legal effect to the Commission's recommenda-
tions. 
Furthermore, while Congress has expanded its own supervisory 
role, it also has ensured that its actions would be well-informed. 
The Act increases from two to five the number of congressional 
advisors to be appointed from each house to oversee international 
trade negotiations. The Senate Finance Committee and the House 
Ways and Means Committee are to nominate the advisors from 
among their own respective members, and the nominees are to be 
appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate and the 
Speaker of the House. 99 In addition, the Act requires that the 
Private Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations, a committee 
chaired by the Special Trade Representative and composed of 45 
representatives of government, labor, industry, agriculture, con-
sumer interests and the general public, 100 be given full access to all 
data concerning negotiating objectives and the progress of negotia-
would not have had the authority to override that decision not to act. See Senate Comm. on 
Finance, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Summary and Analysis of H.R. 10710-The Trade Reform Act 
of 1973, at 33 (1974). However, the House version provided that, if the President ordered 
import relief in the form of either orderly marketing agreements or quantitative restrictions, 
such relief would cease to be effective if, within 90 days from the submission of the 
proclamation of such measures to the Congress, either the House or the Senate adopted a 
resolution of disapproval. Id. at 3 7. The Senate also proposed that the total possible period of 
effectiveness of any given import relief measure be extended from seven to eight years. The 
proposal was adopted. See Trade Act of 1974, § 203(h), 88 Stat. 2017. 
98 Section 172(a) of the Act, 88 Stat. 2009, extends the term of office of the Commission-
ers from six to nine years and provides for appointment of the chairman and vice-chairman on 
the basis of seniority rather than by presidential designation. Section 175(a), 88 Stat. 2011, 
increases slightly the compensation of each member of the Commission and, more important-
ly, provides that the budget of the Commission is to be approved directly by Congress rather 
than by the office of Management and Budget, an arm of the executive branch. Section 174, 
88 Stat. 2011 gives the Commission the authority to hire its own attorneys and to represent 
itself in all judicial proceedings. Under prior law, the Commission was required to request the 
Justice Department for such assistance. 
All of these changes came at the insistence of the Senate Finance Committee which, if its 
version had fully prevailed over that of the House, would have strengthened the independence 
of the Committee even more. Specifically, the Finance Committee would have extended the 
term of each Commissioner to fourteen years; enlarged the membership to seven; and pro-
vided for the appointment of the chairman and vice-chairman by a majority vote of the 
Commission. See S. Rep. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1974). 
99 Trade Act of 1974, § 161(a), 88 Stat. 2008. 
100 Trade Act of 1974, § 135(b), 88 Stat. 1996. 
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tions. 101 The Act further requires that the committee issue formal 
advisory opinions to Congress indicating whether pending trade 
agreements would achieve equity and reciprocity. 102 
The contrast between the original House version of the Trade 
Act of 1974 and the version ultimately passed by Congress high-
lights the question of what is the best way to organize trade policy 
decision-making. The original House version103 would have left 
unchanged the nature of Trade Commission proceedings under the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and Part 206 of the Commission's 
regulations. 104 Essentially, these proceedings were investigatory and 
fact-finding only; since the President retained absolute discretion to 
accept or reject recommendations based on facts found by the 
Commission, the Commission lacked effective power. The Senate 
Finance Committee, by virtue of an amendment that would have 
1·equired the President to grant some form of import relief whenever 
the Commission made an affirmative finding of injury under section 
201(b)(1), 105 would have completely reversed this situation. 106 Even 
though the Trade Act does not go that far, it nevertheless represents 
a significant and desirable reallocation of decision-making power in 
an area that is politically sensitive. 
It has long been recognized that important advantages derive 
from congressional delegation of regulatory power to specialized 
agencies which can provide a continuity of surveillance and exper-
tise over complex economic matters and that these advantages are 
normally unavailable in the three constitutional branches of gov-
ernment.107 Traditionally, administrative agencies have been given 
rule-making, quasi-judicial and executive powers, with judicial re-
view operating as a check on the lawfulness and reasonableness of 
agency decisions. To delegate authority to a specialized, expert 
commission to evaluate complex trade issues and to reach detailed 
conclusions and to omit to provide the means to implement these 
findings and conclusions, and instead to allow either inaction or 
totally different relief, would be anomalous and unsound. 
Prior to the enactment of the Trade Act of 1974 there were only 
101 Trade Act of 1974, § 135(i), 88 Stat. 1998. 
102 Trade Act of 1974, § 135(e), 88 Stat. 1997. 
103 See Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Summary and Analysis of H.R. 
10710-The Trade Reform Act of 1973, at 31 (1974). 
104 19 C.F.R. § 206 (1974). 
105 Trade Act of 1974, § 201(b)(1), 88 Stat. 2012. 
106 Under the Senate version the President could have granted a form of relief different 
from that recommended by the Commission, although even this limited grant of discretion 
would have been subject to a congressional override. See S. Rep. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 83-87 (1974). 
107 See, e.g., J. Landis, The Administrative Process 6-46 (1938). 
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two situations in which the President could circumvent the findings 
and decision of an independent administrative agency. One of these 
has now been partially corrected by the new Trade Act through 
congressional reservation of certain supervisory powers. 108 The 
other is the power of the President under section 801 of the Federal 
Aviation Act of 1958109 to substitute his decision for that of the Civil 
Aeronautics .Board, arrived at after the holding of adjudicatory 
hearings, to award territorial, overseas and international air carrier 
permits. In both instances judicial review is precluded. The Senate 
has severely criticized the power of the President to overrule inde-
pendent agency decisions on air transportation: 
The practical result of this total shifting of authority has 
been to subject the President directly to all the burdens 
and pressures of air commerce regulation. Thus, he is 
called upon in every section 801 case to pass final judg-
ment on the fitness, willingness, and ability of air carriers 
to perform the service in question-these being the funda-
mental statutory criteria for the issuance of any certificate. 
In the great majority of instances, including those covered 
by section 801, the decision called for must be based en-
tirely on economic or technical considerations having no 
practical bearing whatsoever on national defense policy or 
the conduct of foreign relations. . . ,. Matters of an 
economic or regulatory nature which the Board, acting 
under the aegis of the Congress, is alone competent to 
decide and for which it alone is adequately staffed and 
ordered have somehow unwittingly become delegated to 
the Executive. 110 
It is equally anomalous to empower the President to ignore and, 
in effect, to veto a considered agency decision that import relief is 
required; such a process violates oasic principles of sound 
decision-making. Moreover, such an apparatus endangers the credi~ 
bility of government. Presidential use of section 801 powers in 
108 See text at notes 85-92 supra. 
I09 49 u.s.c. § 1461 (1970). 
110 Senate Commerce Comm., Improvement of Procedures for the Development of 
Foreign Air Commerce, S. Rep. No. 119, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1957)., 
Senate Bill1423 in the 85th Congress would have amended section 801, 49 U.S.C. § 1461 
(1970), inter alia, "by restricting the President's power to overrule CAB certification actions to 
foreign air transportation cases involving national defense or foreign policy" and by requiring 
the President "to submit to Congress a report of any instance in which he overrules a Board 
order as contrary to the interests of defense or foreign policy." S. 1423 passed the Senate, 104 
Cong. Rec. 5137 (1957), but was not acted upon by the House. 
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aviation cases has occasioned accusations of improprieties. 111 Simi-
larly, presidential discretion to award import relief was recently 
criticized on the ground that "the White House treated the matter 
'as a political football.' "112 This criticism of the potential for abuse 
does not apply to any particular President. These problems of the 
credibility and integrity of the decision-making process arise from an 
unsound executive-legislative-administrative relationship and have 
occurred in prior presidential administrations and would likely have 
continued in future administrations had Congress not enacted these 
provisions of the 1974 Act. 
B. "Unfair'' Trade Practices Provisions 
Whereas Title IT of the Trade Act of 1974113 deals with means 
of providing relief from injury caused by "fair" but injurious import 
competition, Title ID114 deals with "unfair" and "illegal" trade 
practices affecting United States exports or foreign imports into the 
United States. Distortions arising from inequalities in environmental 
control costs can manifest themselves in the form of foreign sub-
sidies, exemptions from environmental regulations as to selected 
industries competing in international trade markets, or other trade 
practices. 
The 1974 Trade Act broadens existing authority to retaliate 
against "unreasonable" or "unjustifiable" foreign import restrictions 
adversely affecting United States exports. 115 However, this author-
ity continues to be a wholly discretionary one in the hands of the 
President. The Trade Act provides no complaint procedure to force 
a decision on any unfair foreign trade practice of foreign govern-
ments described in section 301. 116 Section 301(a) authorizes the 
111 See Markham, Two Proposals for Amendment of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 
35 J. Air. L. & Com. 591, 597 (1969); Whitney, Integrity of Agency Judicial Process Under the 
Federal Aviation Act: The Special Problem Posed by International Airline Route Awards, 14 
\Vm. & Mary L. Rev. 787 (1973); Note, Section 801 of the Federal Aviation Act-The 
President and the Award of International Air Routes to Domestic Carriers: A Proposal for 
Change, 45 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 517 (1970). 
112 81 American Metal Market, Apr. 1, 1974, at 27. 
m 88 Stat. 2011. 
114 88 Stat. 2041. 
115 Trade Act of 1974, §§ 301-41, 88 Stat. 2041-56. 
116 Trade Act of 1974, § 301(d)(2), 88 Stat. 2042, does provide that, upon the filing of a 
complaint by an interested party alleging restrictive practices by a foreign government, the 
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations is required to conduct public hearings and to 
submit to Congress semiannual summaries of such complaints and hearings. This subsection, 
however, does not require the President to take notice of such complaints. Section 301(e), 88 
Stat. 2042, requires the President to provide an opportunity for the presentation of views 
before taking any action under § 301(a), 88 Stat. 2041. However, the same subsection also 
allows the President to postpone such presentations until after he has acted, if he determines 
that the "national interest" calls for expeditious action. 
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President to suspend concessionary treatment for, and to impose 
duties or other import restrictions on, the imports of any foreign 
country which, inter alia, discriminates or permits "acts or policies 
which are unjustifiable or unreasonable and which burden or re-
strict United States commerce."117 The President also is given au-
thority to act against countries which provide subsidies on exports to 
the United States or to other foreign markets having the effect of 
substantially reducing sales of competitive United States products in 
the United States or elsewhere. us However, in the latter situation 
the President can act only if: (1) the Secretary of the Treasury finds 
that the foreign country does provide subsidies; (2) the Trade Com-
mission finds that the subsidized imports in fact reduce sales of 
competitive United States products; and (3) the President finds that 
the Antidumping Act of 1921, 119 and the countervailing duty law120 
are inadequate to deter such practices. 121 
In acting under the authority of section 301, the President is 
required to consider the relationship of such action to the interna-
tional obligations of the United States. 122 Actions may be under-
taken on a nondiscriminatory treatment basis, i.e., most favored 
nation basis; or the President may act selectively with respect to 
specific countries which maintain unreasonable or unjustifiable re-
strictions. 123 
Section 302 of the 1974 Act124 subjects any presidential action 
taken under section 301 on a nondiscriminatory treatment basis to a 
quasi-veto by Congress. If, before the close of the 90-day period 
following receipt of the presidential decision setting forth such ac-
tion, both the Senate and the House, by an affirmative vote of a 
majority of those present and voting, adopt a resolution of disap-
proval with respect to such action, then the presidential action has 
no effect except with respect to the country whose restrictive acts or 
policies caused the taking of the presidential action in the first 
place. 125 In contrast to its proposals with respect to a grant of 
117 Trade Act of 1974, § 301(a)(2), 88 Stat. 2041. 
118 Trade Act of 1974, § 30l(a)(3), 88 Stat. 2041. The President may also act whenever 
he determines that a foreign country: (1) maintains unjustifiable or unreasonable import 
restrictions which impair the value of the trade commitments made to the United States or 
which discriminate against United States commerce; (2) imposes unjustifiable or unreasonable 
restrictions on access to supplies of foods, raw materials or manufactured products which 
burden or restrict United States commerce. Id. §§ 301(a)(1), (4), 88 Stat. 2041. 
119 19 u.s.c. §§ 160-71 (1970). 
120 19 u.s.c. § 1303 (1970). 
121 Trade Act of 1974, § 301(c), 88 Stat. 2042. 
122 Trade Act of 1974, § 30I(b), 88 Stat. 2042. 
123 Id. 
124 88 Stat. 2043. 
12s Id. 
602 
THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 
import relief, the Senate Finance Committee did not undertake to 
narrow or eliminate the virtually unchecked discretion of the Presi-
dent, as reflected in the original House bill, to retaliate against 
unreasonable or unjustifiable trade practices of foreign trade 
partners. The Committee did agree that the power of the President 
to retaliate against such acts should be explicitly extended to cover 
acts which affect "services" as well as goods, 126 thereby bringing 
under a protective umbrella shipping, aviation, insurance, and 
banking activities.127 · 
The countervailing duty is one of the most direct responses avail-
able to retaliate against a grant, bounty or subsidy accorded a 
foreign industry by its government in the form of an exemption from 
environmental control costs. Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930128 
requires the Secretary of the Treasury to impose countervailing 
duties upon imported merchandise whose manufacture, production, 
or export has been aided directly or indirectly by a bounty or grant 
(i.e., subsidy). Section 331 ofthe Trade Act of 1974129 makes major 
procedural as well as substantive changes in the Tariff Act counter-
vailing duty law. Under new subsection (a) of section 303 of the 
Tariff Act of 1930130 the Secretary of the Treasury is now required 
to initiate a formal investigation to determine whether there exists a 
bounty or grant; the determination must be made within 12 months 
after the date on which the contention was first presented to the 
Secretary. 131 Under prior law there was no prescribed time within 
which a determination had to be made. 132 After an affirmative final 
determination by the Secretary under new subsection (a), any coun-
tervailing duties imposed must apply to any merchandise entered, or 
withdrawn from a warehouse, for consumption on or after the date 
of the publication of such determination in the Federal Register. 133 · 
Moreover, under new subsection (b) of section 303 of the Tariff 
Act of 1930, the reach of the countervailing duties law is extended· to 
cover lion-dutiable items. 134 However, to the extent that the inter-
national obligations of the United States so require, countervailing 
duties may not be imposed on non-dutiable items unless there is an 
affirmative determination by the Trade Commission that the impor-
126 See S. Rep. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1974). 
127 Trade Act of 1974, § 301(a), 88 Stat. 2041, defines the term "commerce" to include 
"services associated with the international trade." Id. 
12S 19 u.s.c. § 1303 (1970). 
129 88 Stat. 2049. 
13° Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a}, 88 Stat. 2049, adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a). 
131 Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2050, adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(4). 
132 Tariff Act of 1930, § 303, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970). 
m Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2051, adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(c). 
134 Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2050, adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(b). 
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tation of the subsidized, non-dutiable merchandise is injuring, or 
likely will injure or impede the establishment or maintenance of a 
domestic industry. 135 No such affirmative finding, of course, is ever 
required with respect to dutiable items. If the Secretary makes a 
determination that a bounty or grant exists with respect to a non-
dutiable import, and after the Trade Commission makes an affirma-
tive finding under section 303(b)(1)(A), 136 the Secretary is authorized 
to order the suspension of liquidation with respect to such merchan-
dise entered or withdrawn from warehouses on or after the day of 
the publication of such determination in the Federal Register. 137 
Thereafter, the Secretary may order the assessment of countervail-
ing duties as provided in section 303{a).13S 
New subsection (d) of section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930139 
adds a whole new concept to the unfair foreign trade statutes. 
During the four-year period following the enactment of the Trade 
Act of 1974, the Secretary of the Treasury is granted discretionary 
authority to refrain from imposing a countervailing duty after an 
affirmative determination is made under section 303{a), if he deter-
mines that: (1) adequate steps have been taken to reduce or elimi-
nate the adverse effect of a bounty or grant; 140 {2) there is reason to 
believe that, under section 102 of the Trade Act of 1974, 141 success-
ful trade agreements will be negotiated with foreign countries which 
provide for the reduction or elimination of barriers to or other 
distortions of international trade; 142 and {3) the imposition of a 
countervailing duty would be likely to jeopardize the satisfactory 
completion of such negotiations. 143 
This grant of discretionary power is designed to implement a 
congressional declaration favoring the establishment of international 
agreements with respect to the use of export subsidies and the 
application of countervailing duties. 144 Nevertheless, the Secretary's 
exercise of discretion under this subsection is subject to congres-
sional review and veto. Whenever the Secretary refrains from im-
posing countervailing duties pursuant to section 303(d), he must 
report his decision, along with his reasons for it, to both houses of 
Congress. 145 At any time after such report, his decision may be 
135 Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2050, adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(b)(l)(B). 
136 Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2050, adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(b)(1)(A). 
137 Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2050, adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(b)(1)(B). 
138 Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2051, adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(d)(2). 
139 Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2051, adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(d). 
140 Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2051, adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(d)(2)(A). 
141 88 Stat. 1982. 
142 Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2051, adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(d)(2)(B). 
143 Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2051, adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(d)(2)(C). 
144 Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2051, adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(d)(1). 
145 Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2051, adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(e)(1). 
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overridden by a simple majority resolution of disapproval by both 
Houses, and the countervailing duty becomes effective im-
mediately. 146 
Section 331(b) of the 1974 Trade Act amends section 516 of the 
1930 Tariff Act147 in such a way as to provide domestic manufac-
turers, producers, or wholesalers, the right to seek judicial review of 
a negative countervailing duty determination by the Secretary of the 
Treasury. 148 Under prior law, judicial review was available only 
after the Secretary had made an affirmative finding of bounty or 
grant and had levied countervailing duties; 149 such a review system 
was only of benefit to importers and others adversely affected by the 
imposition of countervailing duties. The Trade Act of 197 4 amends 
section 516 of the 1930 Tariff Act so that domestic manufacturers, 
producers and wholesalers can petition the Secretary of the Treasury 
to reconsider his determination that countervailing duties should not 
be levied in a particular case. There is no prescribed time within 
which the Secretary must reach a decision on the merits of such a 
petition; however, if the Secretary decides that his initial decision 
denying imposition of a countervailing duty is correct, the petitioner 
must notify the Secretary within 30 days of his intention to contest 
the denial in Customs Court. 150 
V. CONCLUSION 
Congress has recognized that far-reaching changes in the United 
States and world economies require fundamental reevaluation 
of the international trade policy that has prevailed over the last 
several decades. For the first time the U.S. economy is beset by an 
unprecedented combination of economic forces which should not be 
allowed to continue. Various factors-continuing inflation, decline 
in worker productivity, deteriorating balances of trade and pay-
ments, substantial and worsening budget deficits, persistent cur-
rency exchange crises, increasing dependence on foreign energy 
sources and raw materials, chronic shortages of capital and unduly 
high interest rates, new non-tariff international trade distortions 
arising from unequal incidents of environmental control costs-all 
create urgent pressures to devise adequate international trade reg-
ulatory mechanisms capable of coping with these problems. 
146 Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2051, adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(e)(2). 
147 19 u.s.c. § 1516 (1970). 
148 Trade Act of 1974, § 331(b), 88 Stat. 2052, amending 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (1970). 
14 9 19 u.s.c. § 1514 (1970). 
150 Trade Act of 1974, § 331(b), 88 Stat. 2052, amending 19 U.S.C. § 1516(c) (1970). A 
party is permitted to contest a decision of the Secretary of the Treasury under § 516 of the 
Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (1970), by filing a civil action in Customs Court. 28 
u.s.c. § 2632 (1970). 
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With respect to import relief, the Trade Act of 1974 provides 
several important improvements. Initially, the Act substantially re-
duces the burden of proof that industries, firms and groups of 
workers must sustain in hearings before the Trade Commission. 
Thus, the probability of import relief is substantially increased. 
Moreover, once the Trade Commission makes an "affirmative 
finding," the assurance that the President will take effective action 
has been enhanced. Not only is the President's accountability to 
Congress significantly expanded, but the time in which the President 
must act is specified and expedited. Of perhaps equal significance, 
the Act provides for congressional override of a presidential deter-
mination either to refuse import relief or to grant relief other than 
that deemed appropriate by the Trade Commission. Finally, the Act 
establishes procedures calculated to improve the quality of available 
data upon which trade decision-making will be based. 
As to unfair trade practices, the Trade Act of 1974, while 
providing certain improvements, falls short of providing as effective 
remedies as those provided for import relief. The most critical 
shortcoming of the Act is its failure to provide a complete procedure 
capable of forcing a decision on any unfair trade practice described 
in section 301: the Act leaves to presidential discretion the decision 
whether to retaliate against "unreasonable" or "unjustifiable" 
foreign import restrictions affecting United States exports. It is 
difficult to perceive a rationale for having one approach to import 
relief and another for dealing with unfair trade practices. 
On the positive side, the Act significantly enhances the effec-
tiveness of countervailing duties by requiring the Secretary of 
Treasury to impose such duties in cases of foreign subsidies and by 
requiring the Secretary's deliberative process to be completed within 
twelve months of complaint. Similarly, review and veto by Congress 
in cases where the Secretary, despite an "affirmative finding," 
nevertheless exercises his discretionary power to abstain from assess-
ing countervailing duties, is an important check upon executive 
department discretion. Finally, the provision for judicial review in a 
case where the Secretary makes a negative determination provides 
further control over such discretion. 
Since the legislative deliberations involved in the enactment of 
the Trade Act of 1974 were substantial, it is likely that Congress 
will not be inclined to undertake an early reassessment of this 
legislation. However, the economic conditions that provided im-
petus for many of the innovations in the Trade Act continue to 
worsen, and thereby intensify the pressures to create an optimal 
international trade decision-making process. It is imperative that the 
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Congress maintain a vigilant oversight of the effectiveness of the 
processes devised by the Act. If the apparent limitations of the Act 
become clear in light of future events, Congress should act swiftly to 
enact the necessary amendments. 
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